Decades of Agreement, Few
Results on Arms Record-Keeping
Loose guns in Mali.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

Issuing a registered arm in Burkina Faso, 2015.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
By Philip Alpers [ Centre for Armed Violence Reduction ]

R

ecent developments in computerized record-keeping for state-owned arms, ammunition, and
explosives now offer simple, affordable solutions in the lowest-capacity environments. A global
partnership between Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the developers of ArmsTracker software promises to break a twenty-year logjam that, until now, has denied comprehensive, affordable
weapon and ammunition record-keeping systems to states in greatest need.
Beginning in the 1990s, key agencies in humanitarian mine action
(HMA) gradually broadened their missions to include weapon and
ammunition management (WAM). For example, MAG initially
cleared stockpiles of illicit and excess arms and ammunition as
part of its mine action programs in Angola, Burundi, Cambodia,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); helped with safe
ammunition storage in Iraq;1 and currently secures and destroys
small arms and ammunition in nineteen states in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. MAG increasingly considers
these more comprehensive capacity-building frameworks as contributing to armed violence reduction (AVR), alongside a growing
focus on complementary engagement at the community level.2
In a prescient policy brief in 2012, the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) explored “the rationale for this shift from ‘traditional’ mine action to AVR,” noting
that “the role of mine action organizations in supporting AVR is
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invaluable…their relevant expertise, the innovative approaches
that they are adopting (e.g., towards community safety), as well as
the relationships they have already built with national security sector actors give them unique insight, leverage and opportunity to
contribute to AVR.” As a significant incentive for this shift, GICHD
observed that “in many contexts the threats to safety and security
posed by arms are far higher than threats from mines and [explosive remnants of war] ERW.”3 In a 2019 report, the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) noted that WAM
“is becoming a key component of conflict prevention and stabilization strategies, with many conflict-affected and post-conflict States
in Africa increasingly implementing a range of WAM activities.”4
Yet in expanding their brief from locating and destroying explosives one by one to destroying mines, surplus arms, and ammunition, and then perpetually securing the storage of millions of
weapons and munitions in ongoing daily use, AVR practitioners

A collage of ArmsTracker screenshots showing the home or login pages of several installations. Installed with
government agencies across the Pacific and Africa, ArmsTracker can be switched to local languages.
Image courtesy of CAVR.
now face an ever more pressing need. Despite many attempts, no status reports in formats consistent with various international
digital record-keeping solution for state-owned arms has emerged instruments including the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Susto standardize the ongoing management of stockpiles of arms and tainable Development Goals (SDGs). ArmsTracker installations
are also underway with military, law enforcement, border conammunition in low-capacity countries.5
trol, and other agencies in Palau,
To fill this gap, MAG is curData
Security
Fiji, and West Africa. In a project
rently launching AVR pilot projfunded by the United Nations
ects with a potential software Countries often store some of their most
solution in Burkina Faso6 and sensitive information in an arms manage- (UN), 8 the Small Arms Division
Sierra Leone. ArmsTracker (www.
ment system. To guarantee data protection, of the Economic Community of
armstracker.org) is a computer- ArmsTracker is installed by the state’s own
West African States (ECOWAS)
ized record-keeping solution for
security and IT experts. A client agency’s in Abuja, Nigeria, has installed
state-owned arms, ammunition data never leaves its premises unless IT staff
ArmsTracker in readiness for data
and explosives, purpose-built choose to share limited reports, for example input from government agencies
for small island and developing with another state entity. ArmsTracker data
across the fifteen member states
9
nations by the Centre for Armed
is isolated from all other files, with security of ECOWAS. Although Arms7
Violence Reduction (CAVR). A
settings and encryption configured only by Tracker confidentiality agreeregistered charity created by facthe client. No network or Internet connec- ments prevent disclosure of arms
and ammunition quantities or
ulty from the School of Public tion is required.
methods by other than the govHealth at the University of Sydney,
CAVR partners with MAG and others to provide ArmsTracker at ernments themselves, the small arms to be recorded across these
no net cost to qualifying government agencies in countries where projects number in the hundreds of thousands.
Highly-secure and easy-to-use, ArmsTracker requires only
the need is greatest.
CAVR’s first proof-of-concept installation of ArmsTracker was a standalone PC with Microsoft Office to enable accurate, comwith the government of Samoa, where an eighteen-month pilot prehensive record-keeping in local languages. This simple yet
project successfully digitized records of the country’s state-owned powerful software computerizes small arms, ammunition, and
small arms. The government is now equipped to generate instant explosives record-keeping, storage and destruction, imports, and
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ArmsTracker stores internationally standardized details of each arm, a tamper-proof history of each transfer, GPS
coordinates, and more.
Image courtesy of CAVR.
exports. Every installation is tailor-made for each government need for accurate local data is more than just a wish-list item from
agency involved to fit with national and regional laws, to simplify a bevy of UN and European Union (EU) agencies, think tanks,
consistency with multilateral agreements such as arms embargoes, and NGOs in the global north. From 2012 to 2017, the UN Office
anti-terrorism, and transnational crime control instruments, and for Disarmament Affairs logged more requests from UN Member
other relevant international
States for assistance with WAM
Tamper Protection
instruments, all to prevent illicit
than any other category regarding
use and diversion of weapons ArmsTracker stores a cradle-to-grave log of
conventional arms.11 In 2021, there
every transaction made within the system. are still twenty-nine outstanding
and ammunition and to reduce
This permanently identifies the user respon- requests from Sub-Saharan Africa
armed violence. Consultation,
sible for each addition or edit. As the records alone for international assistance
customization, and installation
cannot be deleted, ArmsTracker provides to improve record-keeping capacis followed by staff and coma chain-of-evidence foot-printing system ity for weapons, ammunition, and
munity training. The ambition
of CAVR and MAG is to deliver designed to stand up in court. A multi-level explosives12
permission system restricts access only to
a solution that proves as useful
Much has been written,13 includusers selected by the client.
to the AVR and physical secuing in this publication,14,15 to
rity and stockpile management
encourage practitioners and donors
(PSSM) communities as the Information Management System for to think more broadly—to look beyond the mere collection and
Mine Action (IMSMA) has been to humanitarian demining.
destruction of a few illicit or excess arms and explosives identified
A tool such as ArmsTracker could be seen as long overdue. In a as the immediate problem, and more toward recording and manquarter-century of discussion on the importance of PSSM of con- aging the much larger quantities at risk of diversion and misuse.
ventional arms, effective record-keeping for state-owned muni- These are the weapons, ammunition, and explosives held in existing
tions has been one of the most persistent recommendations raised. stockpiles. Their large numbers, lack of effective management, and
Despite these urgings, military, law enforcement, border control, persistent leakage from unsecured storage suggest that disarmaand other state-owned small arms, ammunition, and explosives are ment programs will never be enough.
typically undocumented or poorly-recorded in communities most
Around the world, countries maintain record-keeping practices
at risk of weapons diversion and armed violence.10 This pressing for state-owned arms and ammunition via national legislation.16
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Governments are very experienced at maintaining these and other
public safety processes. The EU records the details of twentythree million cows from birth to death. India keeps records of
281 million cooking gas bottles, and 1.5 billion motor vehicles
are individually recorded worldwide. But in all this, the international community has yet to promote a comprehensive, low-cost
digitized record-keeping system for weapons, ammunition, and
explosives to help low-capacity states prevent diversion and illicit
use, curb armed violence, and comply with international norms.
Partial solutions have been attempted. In the years 2009–2020,
the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the
Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (RECSA) deployed its Small
Arms Tracing System Software to eight of fifteen member states in
support of fifty-one weapons-marking machines. The aim was to
permanently identify state-owned small arms and light weapons
(SALW).17 From 2017 to 2019, The HALO Trust installed a bespoke
system to digitally record the SALW stockpile of the Armed Forces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 The UN and other agencies have also
maintained computerized records for armed peacekeeping operations, but several seem to have fallen into disuse. More recently,
Conflict Armament Research previewed its web-based application
for arms record-keeping using hand-held devices in Somalia.19
Such efforts commonly focus on military forces whose specialist units and trained personnel already manage defense matériel
with purpose-built asset management systems. Yet a larger need is
often felt by less-resourced military, law enforcement, border control, and other state agencies responsible for their own arms and
ammunition, along with seized or excess weapons held as evidence
or for destruction. In the absence of documented accountability,
these are frequently the weapons that leak into criminal and terrorist misuse.
In Africa, key regional agreements such as the SADC Protocol
on the Control of Firearms (2001), 20 the Nairobi Protocol (2004), 21
the ECOWAS Convention (2006), 22 and the Kinshasa Convention
(2010), 23 all of which oblige Member States to digitally record small
arms, remain largely unrealized in the absence of simple, suitable
software.24 Also lacking from past solutions has been software integration to respond to provisions in the relatively recent ATT.
Major donors including the EU25 have indicated support for such
a system. The specifications have already been written. These range
from the instructions contained in the UN’s International Tracing
Instrument (ITI)26 and the precise detail provided by the UN Office
for Disarmament Affairs’ MOSAIC modules, 27 to the grassroots
handbook for UN disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) practitioners that stipulates “a simple database” with
“close-up and full-frame photographs…of each piece of matériel.28
ArmsTracker carefully follows all these guidelines.
Each ArmsTracker installation faces significant challenges.
Small island states in the Pacific with unarmed police, no military,
and few arms and ammunition imports or exports may assign a
low priority to addressing arms management. In Africa where
the need is much greater, lack of institutional capacity, political and security-related suspicions, the vagaries of international

assistance, and above all else, the need to sustain such a system in
the long term will always provide hurdles to overcome. With these
problems in mind, a simple and affordable, globally standardized
software solution with the long-term support of experienced incountry AVR capacity-builders such as MAG will be crucial.
For more information on ArmsTracker security, tamper protection, arms and ammunition identification, scalability, and other
features, please visit https://armstracker.org. Qualifying government agencies are encouraged to visit a live, password-protected
online demonstration of the software tailored to their purpose.
The button on our website marked “Software Evaluation Copy”
invites agency officials to interact with a full-featured version of
ArmsTracker on the web.
See endnotes page ##
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